In a 1998 episode of the BBC political sitcom Yes, Prime Minster entitled ‘Power to the People’, the Cabinet Secretary Sir Humphrey Appleby and his predecessor Sir Arnold Robinson consult with what has change into generally known as the ‘politician’s fallacy’. The fallacy in query runs as follows:
‘We must do something.
‘This is something.
‘Therefore, we must do that.’
The reason that it is a fallacy is since the ‘something’ in the primary line is insufficiently precisely described. This signifies that any plan of action could fulfil the qualification within the second line – ‘that is something’ – and subsequently may very well be seen as that which have to be done.
How the argument must have run is:
‘We must do something that may effectively address problem X.
‘This will effectively address problem X.
‘Therefore, we must do that.’
The politician’s fallacy which I actually have just described is an example of a wider category of logical error which is referred to in technical terms as ‘a fallacious categorical syllogism’.
A categorical syllogism is a logical argument in three steps through which the conclusion logically follows from the previous two steps. An example of a sound categorical syllogism could be the next argument:
A. A triangle is a plane shape with three straight sides and three angles.
B. X is a plane shape with three straight sides and three angles.
C. Therefore, X is a triangle.
This is a sound argument because since A and B are true, C must subsequently even be true. Another example of valid categorical syllogism could be:
A. All philosophers are thinkers.
B. Some philosophers are teachers.
C. Therefore, some thinkers are teachers.
Here again, because A and B are true subsequently C must even be true.
A fallacious categorical syllogism, against this, occurs when what’s stated in the primary two steps doesn’t result in the conclusion drawn within the third step. Consider the next argument:
A. All cats have 4 legs.
B. My dog has 4 legs.
C. Therefore, my dog is a cat.
This argument is invalid because although statement B could also be true, statement C doesn’t follow because it will not be a sufficient definition of a cat to say that it has 4 legs. There are other creatures (including dogs) that even have 4 legs. Consequently, the proven fact that my dog has 4 legs doesn’t make it a cat.
A second example could be
A. All students carry backpacks.
B. My grandfather carries a backpack.
C. Therefore, my grandfather is a student.
This argument is invalid since it will not be the very fact of carrying a backpack that makes someone a student and so the proven fact that my grandfather carries a backpack doesn’t make him one.
The reason I actually have been occupied with these sorts of arguments recently is due to the development of the Living in Love and Faith process within the Church of England. What is becoming ever clearer as the method continues is that its only likely end point is the Church of England joining the ranks of those other churches world wide who’ve accepted same-sex marriage.
The reason I say it’s because of the dilemma facing those pushing for a liberal sexual agenda within the Church of England, which is that in response to the Church’s immemorial teaching, marriage is exclusively between two people of the other sex and sex outside marriage constitutes the sin generally known as fornication. This creates an issue on the subject of blessing same-sex sexual relationships and ordaining those that are in such relationships. This is because from the standpoint of traditional Anglican theology (and of traditional Christian theology more generally) it will not be permissible to either bless fornication or to ordain those that are habitual fornicators and people in same-sex sexual relationships must by definition be engaging in formication since their relation is non-marital.
This leaves two routes open for individuals who support the acceptance of same-sex relationships. They can either go down the route of claiming that sex outside marriage will not be a sin, or they will say that the understanding of marriage might be expanded to incorporate same-sex relationships.
Although a lot of bishops, including the previous Archbishop of Canterbury, have made statements which reflect the primary approach, I believe it is probably going that it’s the second approach that may eventually be adopted since it is simpler to present as indicating that there was no fundamental change in Church of England doctrine. The Church of England stands where it has at all times stood, it’ll be said, holding that the correct place for sex is inside marriage, but now it has an enlarged understanding of what marriage means through which two individuals who love each other might be married no matter their sex.
The problem with this approach, nonetheless, is that it is determined by the validity of the next categorical syllogism:
A. Marriage is a loving relationship between two people.
B. A same-sex couple can form a loving relationship.
C. Therefore, a same sex couple might be married.
There are two major difficulties with this syllogism. The first is that the definition of marriage in A makes it very hard to differentiate marriage from other types of relationship. Thus, a father and a daughter, a brother and a sister, or two monks may very well be in a loving relationship. If marriage is defined simply when it comes to being in a loving relationship, then it may very well be said that in all three examples the individuals concerned were married to one another.
Now, most individuals, if presented with these examples, would say they were ridiculous and that the people concerned can’t be said to be married to one another. The reason for it’s because they hold that marriage involves something greater than simply two people loving each other. If this were the case, for instance, one would should say that two people engaging in an affair are married to one another, which could be problematic because the very definition of an affair is a sexual relationship outside marriage.
All this being the case the syllogism because it stands cannot work and subsequently can’t be an argument for accepting same-sex marriage.
The second difficulty is that the definition of marriage in A doesn’t do justice to the understanding of the meaning of marriage that the Christian Church and Western society as an entire has held for 1000’s of years.
This understanding is helpfully summarised by Sherif Girgis, Ryan Anderson and Robert George of their book What is Marriage? They note that the standard view of marriage, what they call the ‘conjugal view’, sees marriage as a comprehensive union between two people made up of a lot of interrelated elements which distinguish it from easy friendship.
First, they write, marriage is traditionally consummated by coitus, the approaching together of the husband’s penis and the wife’s vagina, and in this fashion:
“… Marriage unites individuals of their bodies in addition to their minds. The bodily union of two people is very similar to the bodily union of organs in a person. Just as one’s organs form a unity by coordinating for the biological good of the entire (one’s survival), so the bodies of a person and woman form a unity by coordination (coitus) for a biological good (reproduction) of the union as an entire. In selecting such biological coordination, spouses unite bodily in a way that has generative significance, they don’t merely touch or interlock. This generative form of act physically embodies their specific marital commitment.”
Secondly, they declare:
“… spouses unite bodily only by coitus, which is ordered towards the great of bringing latest human lighting for world. New life, innocence, is one human good amongst others but in one other sense, it transcends and includes other human goods. Having consented to sharing within the generative acts that unite them organically (as ‘one flesh’), spouses cooperate in other areas of life (mental, recreational, etc) within the broad domestic sharing uniquely apt for fostering the all round development of latest human beings. Of course, in addition they cooperate within the tasks of parenting when children do come. Ordinary friendships – the union of hearts and minds embodied in conversations and in various joint pursuits – can have a more limited and variable scope.”
Finally, they are saying:
“… In view of its comprehensiveness in these other senses, marriage inherently calls for a comprehensive commitment: permanence and exclusivity. Like the union of organs into one healthy whole organism, marriage is correctly total and lasting for the lifetime of the parts. (Indeed, comprehensive union might be achieved only by two people because no act can organically unite three or more people bodily.) Again, marriage is uniquely apt for having and rearing children, an inherently open-ended task calling for unconditional commitment. But friendships as such require no promise of permanence …”
Thus of their view, marriage involves bodily in addition to mental responses and a “special link” to children and domestic life, in addition to “everlasting and exclusive commitment” – three elements that every one “converge in, and go to constitute, the conjugal view”.
If that is what marriage is then there are insuperable problems with the syllogism supporting same-sex marriage. First, although a wedding is a loving relationship between two people, it’s a selected form of loving relationship. Secondly, this specific form of loving relationship is one which by its very nature can only be between two people of the other sex. This is because, as Girgis, Anderson and George note, at the guts of marriage, traditionally understood, is the one flesh union led to by coitus, an act involving a person and woman that has by nature generative potential.
It is because that is the case that it will not be arbitrary discrimination to say that two people of the identical sex can’t be married. It is merely a press release of fact. They can’t be a part of a comprehensive union with the act of coitus at its heart. This is why the comparison sometimes drawn between the rejection of same-sex marriage and the prohibition of inter-racial marriage is mistaken. The latter is unfair because two people of a special race can form a marital union, whereas the previous reflects the proven fact that two people of the identical sex cannot achieve this.
What all this implies for the Church of England’s Living in Love and Faith process is that the concept that the Church can redefine marriage to incorporate relationships between two people of the identical sex while claiming that this involves no change, and the Church can still stand where it has at all times stood, is an illusion. As we’ve seen, the argument that two people of the identical sex who love each other might be married is incompatible with the standard understanding of what marriage is and involves a definition of marriage that makes marriage indistinguishable from types of relationship that will be universally recognised to not be marriage in any respect.
As if this weren’t enough, the Church of England has at all times held that the standard conjugal view of marriage is one which was instituted by God himself at creation. What would subsequently should be established is that this view was mistaken and that we now know that God supports the redefined view of marriage. No one has yet managed to make a plausible case for either proposition.
Finally, all of the available social science evidence we’ve tells us that societies flourish best when children are brought up by their biological parents in a relationship through which their parents are permanently and exclusively committed to one another and committed to the flourishing of their children. This type of a relationship is becoming increasingly rare in British society and so why would the Church of England wish to further undermine it by supporting a latest understanding of marriage which has no needed connection to the birth and nurturing of kids?
 In a 1998 episode of the BBC political sitcom Yes, Prime Minster entitled ‘Power to the People’, the Cabinet Secretary Sir Humphrey Appleby...){kind=link}