In the context of abortion, personhood is the defining requirement for individual rights. A Princeton philosopher, Peter Singer, holds the view that abortion is suitable because the fetus is just not an individual, which he defines as someone who’s rational, conscious, and self-aware. (5)
However, this definition is severely lacking. Under this definition, each time I am going to bed at night, I stop to be an individual. When someone is stressed in traffic and drives unsafely in a moment of irrational thought, they, too, stop to be an individual. No, Singer’s definition lacks consideration of the character of the entity in query.
An embryo can’t rationalize, be conscious, or be self-aware (at that moment), but that’s on account of how old it’s, not what it’s. An amoeba, however, can’t exhibit any of those sentient points either; not since it hasn’t developed them yet, but since it’s not in its nature to. With the embryo, it’s in its nature to rationalize, be conscious, and self-aware.
After the atrocities of the Holocaust, the United Nations proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. (6) Along with the preamble, which states human rights are the “rights of all members of the human family,” Article 3 explains, “Everyone has the best to life, liberty, and security of person.” Article 6 declares, “Everyone has the best to recognition in every single place as an individual before the law.” Lastly, Article 7 says, “All are equal before the law and are entitled with none discrimination to equal protection of the law.”
The undeniable fact that you might be human mechanically assigns you human rights. When speaking of animal rights, the crucial requirement is to be an animal. Women’s rights call for the person to be a girl. Would it not logically follow that each one that’s needed for human rights is so that you can be human? Therefore, it’s what you might be that defines your personhood (and human rights), not when (how old) you might be.
However, one can easily argue a separate definition of personhood altogether. I discovered many to contemplate the fetus void of personhood by defining an individual as someone who displays intentional, goal-driven motion. (7) This agent must show deliberate motion in step with their very own reflection and desires.
Nevertheless, science shows a fetus to satisfy this definition as well. By 14 weeks, the unborn child shows goal-driven movements. As the limbs reach their goal, there may be marked deceleration, an indicator of intentional motion. Other studies show an exploratory and sensation-seeking nature of the kid as early as 10 weeks gestation. (9)
Using real-time ultrasonography, researchers saw the lips, cheeks, ears, and parietal bone (areas wealthy in innervation) often being touched by the hands (also richly innervated). Fetuses were also observed to explore the boundary between innervated and non-innervated regions of the developing body. As the nervous system grows and boundary lines change, so too does fetal exploration of those boundaries. Even with the brand new definition of personhood, findings show fetal humans to be individuals.
Yet, what of the mother’s rights? Isn’t it her body? Isn’t the fetus a part of her body?
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