THE fire at Grenfell Tower, Britain’s worst residential fire because the Second World War, was the culmination of “a long time of failure by central government and other bodies in positions of responsibility in the development industry”, the official inquiry has concluded (News, 1 November 2019).
The inquiry was announced the day after the fireplace in June 2017 (News, 16 June 2017). Its final report condemns “systematic dishonesty” on the a part of those that made and sold the cladding panels and insulation products used on the high-rise tower block.
Seventy-two people were killed within the blaze.
“The easy truth is that the deaths that occurred were all avoidable, and that those that lived within the tower were badly failed over various years and in various alternative ways by those that were accountable for ensuring the security of the constructing and its occupants,” the chair, Sir Martin Moore-Bick, said on Wednesday.
The Archbishop of Canterbury said in a press release that afternoon that it had been “chilling to read that systematic dishonesty and a refusal to take heed to concerns were partly in charge for Grenfell Tower becoming a death trap. This is a dreadful reminder that human lives should never be sacrificed within the pursuit of profit.”
Dr Graham Tomlin, who served because the Bishop of Kensington from 2015 to 2022 and has advocated for survivors and the bereaved families, described the report as “devastating. It tells a story of systemic failure, disregard for safety, firms, organisations, and individuals turning a blind eye to repeated warnings of what could occur.”
The seven-volume report identifies failings on the a part of each public- and private- sector bodies, including the Government, the Tenant Management Organisation, the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, those that manufactured and supplied the materials utilized in the refurbishment, the architect (Studio E), and the London Fire Brigade.
“Not all of them bear the identical degree of responsibility for the eventual disaster, but, as our reports show, all contributed to it in a method or one other, generally through incompetence but in some cases through dishonesty and greed,” Sir Martin said.
The report is very critical of the Department for Communities and Local Government, led between 2010 and 2015 by Sir Eric Pickles. It records that, by 2016, the department was “well aware” of the risks posed by way of flamable cladding panels and insulation, particularly to high-rise buildings, but “didn’t act on what it knew”.
In the years after the Lakanal House fire of 2009, through which six people died, “the federal government’s deregulatory agenda, enthusiastically supported by some junior ministers and the Secretary of State, dominated the department’s pondering to such an extent that even matters affecting the security of life were ignored, delayed or disregarded,” the report says.
It can be damning in regards to the firms that supplied the flamable materials utilized in the refurbishment of the tower between 2012 and 2016, concluding that they “engaged in deliberate and sustained strategies to control the testing processes, misrepresent test data, and mislead the market”.
Arconic, which supplied rainscreen panels, “deliberately concealed from the market” the true extent of the danger of using its product in the shape used on the tower. The company was, the report says, “determined to use what it saw as weak regulatory regimes in certain countries (including the UK)”.
At the time the inquiry was launched, Kingspan, which manufactured insulation, was still knowingly making a “false market” for its product to be used on high-rise buildings, having made a “false claim” about its safety, the report says.
Sir Martin’s report also exposes serious failures of regulation and compliance. Bodies were compromised by their close relationship with firms. Among his recommendations is the appointment of a construction regulator to oversee all features of the development industry.
”The dishonest strategies of Arconic and Kingspan succeeded in a big measure resulting from the incompetence of the British Board of Agrément [an organisation that certifies the compliance of products], its failure to stick robustly to the system of checks it had put in place, and an ingrained willingness to accommodate customers as a substitute of insisting on high standards and adherence to a contract that was intended to take care of them,” the report says.
The Building Research Establishment was marred by “unprofessional conduct, inadequate practices, an absence of effective oversight, poor reporting and an absence of scientific rigour”, while the Local Authority Building Control “didn’t scrutinise properly the claims made for the products by the manufacturers and as a substitute adopted uncritically the language they suggest.
“In short, it was willing to accommodate the shopper on the expense of those that relied on the certificates.”
The architect, Studio E, is described as bearing “a really significant degree of responsibility for the disaster”.
Completed in 1974, the 24-storey Tower was owned by the London Borough of Kensington and Chelsea and managed by the Tenant Management Organisation, whose relationship with residents had deteriorated right into a “toxic atmosphere”, Sir Martin’s report says.
The TMO “overlooked the incontrovertible fact that the residents were individuals who relied on it for a protected and decent home and the privacy and dignity that a house should provide”, it says. The TMO got here to treat fire safety as “an inconvenience moderately than an important aspect of its duty to administer its property fastidiously”.
A single person, Carl Stokes, was employed as fire-risk assessor for your entire estate, despite lacking qualifications and experience. The TMO appointed Studio E as architects, despite the incontrovertible fact that the firm had no experience of over-cladding a high-rise constructing.
The Royal Borough of Kensington Council took “little or no account” of a highly critical review of fireside safety carried out for the TMO in 2009. The years between 2009 and 2017 were “were marked by a persistent indifference to fireside safety, particularly the security of vulnerable people”.
The London Fire Brigade is described as affected by a “chronic lack of effective management and leadership, combined with an undue emphasis on process”.
The response of the Government and native council to the fireplace in the primary week was “muddled, slow, indecisive and piecemeal” and the council’s leadership is described within the report as “wholly inadequate” to the duty.
“Certain features of the response demonstrated a marked lack of respect for human decency and dignity and left lots of those immediately affected feeling abandoned by authority and utterly helpless.”
The report concludes: “Those who emerge from the events with the best credit, and whose contribution only emphasised the inadequacies of the official response, are the members of the local people. With the support of local voluntary organisations, they provided support within the hours immediately following the fireplace when the authorities were conspicuous by their absence.”
On Wednesday, the deputy assistant commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, Stuart Cundy, said that the force would want to “examine the report — line by line — alongside the evidence from the criminal investigation”. This would take at the very least 12 to 18 months. A team of 180 officers and staff is engaged on this investigation: nine firms or organisations and 58 individuals are listed as suspects.
An announcement from Grenfell United, which represents survivors and bereaved families, said that the report represented “a big chapter within the journey to truth, justice and alter. But justice has not been delivered. The inquiry report reveals that every time there’s a clash between corporate interest and public safety, governments have done every thing they will to avoid their responsibilities to maintain people protected. The system isn’t broken, it was built this manner. . . We were failed generally by incompetence and in lots of cases by calculated dishonesty and greed.”
Archbishop Welby said that justice for the survivors and bereaved — whom he praised for his or her bravery in testifying to the inquiry — was “long overdue”. The findings must “prompt deep reflection and meaningful change from all those identified as having failed victims”.
He repeated his calls for a fairer housing system, which, he said, must be a spot of safety. “Home was not that for the residents of the Grenfell Tower. This tragedy shows us that we must cherish and protect everyone in our society, and that safety shouldn’t just be the preserve of the rich.”
Dr Tomlin said: “The report is an exercise in truth-telling, identifying wrongs that were committed, which is itself a very important step towards justice and a more lasting peace of mind and heart that such justice could bring.
“Jesus once said ‘is not going to God grant justice to those that cry out to him day and night?’ Those caught up on this tragedy have been crying for such justice for seven years and this report is hopefully a step in that direction.”
